Abstract. The flow logic approach to static analysis amounts to specifying the admissibility of solutions to analysis problems; when specified using formulae in stratified alternation-free least fixed point logic one may use efficient algorithms for computing the least admissible solutions. We extend this scenario to validate the fulfilment of safety and security constraints on admissible solutions; the modified development produces a least solution together with a boolean value indicating whether or not the constraints are validated or violated. The main contribution is the development of a deterministic heuristics for obtaining a solution that is close to the least solution while enforcing the safety or security constraints. We illustrate it on the Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy where the heuristics is used to suggest modifications to the security annotations of entities in order for the security policy to hold.
Introduction
The goals of the paper are perhaps best explained by means of an analogy. In the world of type systems one frequently distinguishes between soft typing and strong typing. In soft typing all programs can be typed (possibly with an ever encompassing top type) and the goal is to use types to provide as much meaningful information about subprograms as possible. In strong typing the whole point of the type system is to reject certain programs as being ill-formed (including those that might lead to certain kinds of errors when executed) whereas providing meaningful information about subprograms is an important secondary aim. Indeed, the slogan of strong typing is that "well typed programs cannot go wrong" [8] . We might say that soft typing focuses on solving a type inference problem whereas strong typing focuses on enforcing the solvability of a type inference problem (which admittedly involves a solving phase as well) subject to additional constraints.
In this paper we consider the world of static analysis as embodied in data flow and control flow analysis. Here the view traditionally is that of solving an analysis problem in order to provide information that may be useful e.g. in case of a compiler generating better than naive code. When viewed in the general framework of abstract interpretation [5, 9] one usually establishes a Moore Family result showing that a least solution always exists. Given a problem cls we shall write S(cls) for the least solution ρ. In Section 2 we slightly extend our approach [11, 10] based on formulae in stratified alternation-free least fixed point logic.
Our first contribution in Section 3 is to extend the development so as to be more directly applicable to software validation, e.g. for enforcing safety and security policies. Quite frequently it is possible to formulate such policies as sets of safety and security constraints upon the solution S(cls). Given a problem cls with such additional constraints we shall write V(cls) for the least solution ρ, as computed by S(cls), together with a boolean value b indicating the truth value of the constraints. We develop an extension of our approach where safety and security constraints are an integral part of the logical formalism. This development is illustrated on an example showing how to enforce that programs in a functional language never attempt to perform a function call unless the value applied is indeed a function.
This paves the way for our main contribution in Section 4 where we consider how to deal with a problem cls that cannot be validated, i.e. a problem cls for which V(cls) = (ρ, false). Here our goal is to develop a deterministic heuristics for finding a small modification to the solution ρ such that the problem can be validated under the assumption that the behaviour of can be admitted. This idea has in part been inspired by the non-standard approach to fixpoints explored in [7] and in our case amounts to an iterative approach to recalculating solutions. The desired result of our heuristics is H(cls) = (ρ, ) where is the small modification deemed necessary and ρ is the resulting least solution for which the safety and security constraints can be enforced; we may write this as V(cls @ ) = (ρ, true) where cls @ is a syntactic mechanism used to enforce that ρ ⊇ .
The main motivating example for this development is from the world of mandatory access control policies. Here might indicate additional entities to be considered to be within the Trusted Computing Base; we present an example showing how to formulate the Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy [2, 6] and how to use the heuristics for suggesting modifications to the security annotations of entities in order for the security policy to hold.
Flow Logic using ALFP
Flow Logic [11] is a specification oriented approach to static analysis of programs.
For a program P of interest the focus is on specifying when an analysis estimate A correctly describes the behaviour of P during evaluation. This takes the form of a judgement A P that yields true whenever this is the case. Usually A is an element of a complete lattice whose greatest element satisfies the specification; hence the focus at this stage merely is to exclude analysis estimates that are observably incorrect and there is no attempt to demand that the analysis estimate is the best or least choice possible. The definition of A P often takes the form of recursive definitions (as in Figures 1, 2 and 3 to be developed subsequently) and in general a co-inductive definition interpretation is desired; when there is only limited use of higher-order features (as in the examples in the present paper) the co-inductive interpretation coincides with the more usual inductive interpretation.
The formal statement of correctness of the specification is often expressed with respect to an operational semantics of programs, P → P and takes the form A P ∧ P → P ⇒ A P for ensuring that the analysis estimate correctly describes all program derivations. The proof is usually fairly straight-forward by induction on the structure of P → P .
Having validated the correctness of the specification the next concern is to ensure that the specification admits more usuable analysis estimates than . Following the overall approach of Abstract Interpretation [5] this takes the form of showing that the set of admissible solutions constitute a Moore family:
This corresponds to what is sometimes called the model intersection property of logics and is related to the existence of principal types in type systems [9] .) It follows that there exists a least solution
and that it satisfies the specification, i.e. A 0 P . Knowing that there exists a best analysis estimate our final concern will be how to compute it in a practical manner, e.g. in polynomial time in the size of the program P . One approach is to generate a set of constraints or (as we shall do in the present paper) a suitable logical formula for the program P . This is particularly direct if the specification of A P has already been performed using a suitable logic and if the specification coincides with its inductive interpretation. In this case it is usually fairly straightforward to expand the defining clauses of A P into an equivalent logical formula cls.
Alternating Least Fixpoint Logic
We now review a suitable logic that has been used in a number of static analyses: The Alternation-free fragment of Least Fixpoint Logic (ALFP) extends Horn clauses by allowing both existential and universal quantifications in preconditions, negative queries (subject to the notion of stratification), disjunctions of preconditions, and conjunctions of conclusions. Definition 1. Given a fixed countable set X of variables and a finite alphabet R of predicate symbols we define the set of ALFP formulae (or clause sequences), cls, together with clauses, cl, and preconditions, pre, by the grammar
where x ∈ X , R ∈ R and k is at least 1.
Occurrences of R and ¬R in preconditions are called queries and negative queries, respectively, whereas the other occurrences of R are called assertions of the predicate R. We write 1 for the always true clause.
Stratification. In order to ensure desirable theoretical and pragmatic properties in the presence of negation, we introduce a notion of stratification similar to the one in Datalog [4, 1] . Intuitively, stratification ensures that a negative query is not performed until the predicate queried has been fully asserted. This is important for ensuring that once a precondition evaluates to true it will continue doing so even after further assertions of predicates.
Definition 2.
A formula cls is stratified w.r.t. rank whenever it has the form cls = cl 1 , · · · , cl k , and the function rank : R → {0, · · · , k} satisfies the following properties for all i = 1, · · · , k:
1. rank (R) ≥ i for every assertion R in cl i ; 2. rank (R) ≤ i for every positive query R in cl i ; and 3. rank (R) < i for every negative query ¬R in cl i .
A formula cls is stratified if there exists a ranking function rank such that cls is stratified w.r.t. rank .
Not all formulae are stratified and a formula may be stratified w.r.t. some ranking functions but not stratified w.r.t other ranking functions. Given a formula cls = cl 1 , · · · , cl k one can construct an optimal ranking function rank, i.e. one that makes cls stratified w.r.t. rank if and only if cls is stratified, by setting rank(R) = k if there are no (positive or negative) queries to R in cls, otherwise setting rank(R) = 0 if there are no assertions to R in cls, and setting rank(R) = i if cl i is the rightmost clause containing an assertion to R.
Stratifiability. Sometimes a clause does not have the form of a formula that is stratified w.r.t. some ranking function rank although it can easily be rearranged into such a formula. This is possible if for each subclause · · · R · · · ⇒ · · · S · · · we have that rank (R) ≤ rank (S) and furthermore, if for each subclause · · · ¬R · · · ⇒ · · · S · · · we have that rank (R) < rank (S). We shall say that a clause cl is stratifiable w.r.t rank whenever these conditions are met. One approach to obtaining a stratified formula cls from the clause cl is simply to construct it as cls = cl 1 , · · · , cl k where each cl i is obtained from cl by replacing assertions of rank different from i with the clause 1.
and · · · and (ρ, σ) |= cl k Table 1 . Semantics of preconditions, clauses and formulae.
In a similar vein a clause cl is stratifiable if it is possible to construct a ranking function rank such that the clause is stratifiable w.r.t. rank . An easy test for this condition is to build a graph with predicate symbols as nodes (called R and S below) and two kinds of edges; there is a normal edge from R to S if the clause contains a subclause · · · R · · · ⇒ · · · S · · · and there is a fat edge from R to S if the clause contains a subclause · · · ¬R · · · ⇒ · · · S · · · . Then the clause is stratifiable if and only if there is no loop containing a fat edge.
Stratifiable clauses are accepted by a preprocessor to the Succinct Solver [10] and are turned into appropriately stratified formulae which are then solved.
Constraint Satisfaction
We take a pure approach where the logic is interpreted over a universe U of constants. Given interpretations ρ and σ for predicate symbols and variables, respectively, we define in Table 1 the following satisfaction relations: (ρ, σ) |= pre for preconditions pre, (ρ, σ) |= cl for clauses cl, and (ρ, σ) |= cls for formulas cls.
In particular, we write ρ(R) for the set of n-tuples (a 1 , · · · , a n ) from U n associated with the n-ary predicate R and σ(x) for the element of U denoted by the variable x.
We shall mainly be interested in closed formulae cls, i.e. clause sequences that have no free variables. Hence the choice of the interpretation σ is immaterial, so we can fix an arbitrary interpretation σ 0 . We then call an interpretation ρ of the predicate symbols, a solution to the formula cls provided (ρ, σ 0 ) |= cls.
Let ∆ be the set of interpretations ρ of predicate symbols in R over U and let rank be a fixed ranking function.
Definition 3. The lexicographical ordering is defined by ρ 1 ρ 2 if and only if there is some j ∈ {0, · · · , k} such that the following properties hold:
The subset-ordering ⊆ is given by ρ 1 ⊆ ρ 2 whenever ∀R ∈ R : ρ 1 (R) ⊆ ρ 2 (R).
Proof. We first assume that ρ 1 ⊆ ρ 2 and prove that ρ 1 ρ 2 . For this let j ∈ {−1, · · · , k} be maximal such that rank (R) ≤ j =⇒ ρ 1 (R) = ρ 2 (R) and let j be the smaller of j + 1 and k; then it is immediate to show that ρ 1 ρ 2 using that ρ 1 ⊆ ρ 2 .
To show that the converse result does not need to hold it suffices to exhibit ρ 1 and ρ 2 such that ρ 1 ρ 2 but ρ 1 ⊆ ρ 2 . For this we consider predicates R 1 and R 2 with rank (R i ) = i and define
We then have ρ 1 ρ 2 (as may be seen by taking take j = 1) but
Proposition 1 (from [10] ). The set ∆ = (∆, ) forms a complete lattice. The solution set ∆ cls = {ρ ∈ ∆ | (ρ, σ 0 ) |= cls} forms a Moore family, i.e. it is closed under greatest lower bounds (w.r.t. ), whenever cls is a closed and stratified formula.
The Succinct Solver
In the sequel we shall only be interested in the least solution ρ as guaranteed by the above proposition; formally it is given by
and is the solution computed by the Succinct Solver [10] .
For the purposes of this paper it suffices with the following imprecise account of the operation of the Succinct Solver; the actual algorithm [10] operates in a considerably more intelligent manner. Given a stratified clause cls we may construct two functionals N cls and F cls . For this we shall write ρ = ρ 1 ∪ · · · ∪ ρ k where each ρ i defines the predicates of rank i (where we assume for simplicity of presentation that all predicates have non-zero rank). We set N cls (ρ 1 ∪· · ·∪ρ k ) = ( 1 ∪ · · · ∪ k ) whenever 1 ∪ · · · ∪ k constitutes the new contribution to the predicates arising from one pass through cls. Then we set
where the intention is that i indicates the first component of N cls (ρ) that is not ⊥. The Succinct Solver may then be described as operating until stabilisation of F cls , i.e. S(cls)
For a partial order ≤ (e.g. or ⊆) we shall say that the functional F is ≤-monotonic if ∀ρ 1 , ρ 2 :
Fact 2. The functional F cls is ⊆-extensive and -extensive. (The functional need not be ⊆-monotonic nor -monotonic.)
Proof. That F cls is ⊆-extensive, i.e. ρ ⊆ F cls (ρ), is obvious by construction: we have both ρ ⊆ ρ and ρ ⊆ ρ ∪ i . That F cls is -extensive, i.e. ρ F cls (ρ), then follows using Fact 1.
That F cls need not be -monotonic can be shown by considering the scenario in the proof of Fact 1. Consider two predicates R 1 and R 2 with rank (R i ) = i and take cls = R 1 (·). Next define ρ 1 by ρ 1 (R 1 ) = ∅, ρ 1 (R 2 ) = {·}, define ρ 2 by ρ 2 (R 1 ) = {·}, ρ 2 (R 2 ) = ∅, and define ρ 3 by ρ 3 (R 1 ) = {·}, ρ 3 (R 2 ) = {·}. We then have F cls (ρ 1 ) = ρ 3 and F cls (ρ 2 ) = ρ 2 and ρ 1 ρ 2 but ρ 3 ρ 2 . This shows that
That F cls need not be ⊆-monotonic can be shown in a similar way by taking
Safety and Security Constraints on ALFP
As a motivating example consider a simple functional language
l where e l ranges over labelled expressions. A control flow analysis keeps track of which values (truth values and lambda abstractions) reach which points in the program. We axiomatise it using these predicates:
indicates that the set of values arising at a subexpression labelled l may contain the value v, R(x, v) indicates that in the environment the variable x may be bound to the value v, P(l, v) indicates that the value v may be an actual parameter to a λ-abstraction whose body is labelled l, B(v) indicates that v is a boolean value in the program, A(l) indicates that l labels the body of a λ-abstraction in the program.
For a given program e l we then generate clauses (A, B, C, P, R) e l as shown in Figure 1 . Here the variables (like u, v and w) range over the universe U that consists of the basic values tt and ff and all labels. In the clause for an application (e l a typical value of u will be some label l 0 denoting a λ-abstraction. The overall clause generated for the entire program is the conjunction of all the clauses above. It is clearly a stratifiable clause w.r.t. a rank function given by rank (B ) = rank (A ) = 1 and rank (C ) = rank (R ) = rank (P ) = 2. Example 1. In order to validate the correct behaviour of the program it would be prudent to impose constraints ensuring that only functions are applied to arguments and that only booleans are used to discriminate between branches of conditionals. Such constraints can be checked by evaluating the following formulae on the least solution to the clause generated above:
for an application (e It would be preferable if the constraints could be integrated with the specification of the clause generation. However, this is not possible because rather than giving rise to a constraint that may evaluate to false, it would give rise to merely adding new "spurious elements" to the predicates A and B like asserting A(ff), A(tt) or B(l 0 ). In this respect it is worth pointing out that the least solution as produced by S ensures that no such "spurious elements" are part of the least solution (because they are not explicitly demanded to be so by the clause constructed above). 2
Constrained ALFP
We therefore extend the syntax of ALFP by allowing explicit occurrences of constraints. We distinguish between an assertion R(x 1 , · · · , x n ) and a constraint by writing the latter as R!(x 1 , · · · , x n ).
Definition 4. The set of constrained ALFP clauses, cl, are given by
whereas constrained preconditions and formulae are as in Definition 1.
A constrained formula cls is stratified w.r.t. rank whenever it has the form cls = cl 1 , · · · , cl k , and the function rank : R → {0, · · · , k} satisfies the following properties for all i = 1, · · · , k:
A constrained formula cls is stratified if there exists a ranking function rank such that cls is stratified w.r.t. rank .
In the definition of stratified we have taken the view (to become even clearer when discussing constraint violations below) that a predicate must not be used as a constraint until it has been fully asserted.
The optimal ranking function is constructed much as before: rank(R) = k if there are no (positive or negative) queries to R nor constraints on R in cls, otherwise rank(R) = 0 if there are no assertions to R in cl, and rank(R) = i if cl i is the rightmost clause containing an assertion to R.
The considerations of stratifiability apply mutatis mutandis; as before there is a normal edge from R to S if the clause contains a subclause · · · R · · · ⇒ · · · S · · · and there is a fat edge from R to S if the clause contains a subclause · · · ¬R · · · ⇒ · · · S · · · . (In both cases S denotes an assertion rather than a constraint.) Much as before a constrained clause cl is stratifiable if and only if there is no loop containing a fat edge. However, when constructing the stratified formula cls we may have to introduce a new rank k + 1 and construct it as cls = cl 1 , · · · , cl k+1 where each cl i is obtained from cl by replacing assertions of rank different from i with the clause 1 and furthermore replacing constraints of rank different from i−1 with the clause 1. As an example, the clause R(a)
Constraint Validation
We shall deal with the semantics of constrained ALFP in a syntactic manner, by defining two ways in which to translate a constrained formula into a formula of ALFP. The function ignore simply replaces · · · R!(x) · · · by · · · 1 · · · and hence ignores the constraints imposed (see Table 2 for the details):
It is useful for extracting the constraint-free part of the formula for which the least solution is desired. If cls is a stratified and constrained formula then clearly ignore(cls) is a stratified formula of ALFP.
Similarly, the function enforce replaces · · · R!(x) · · · by · · · R(x) · · · and hence ignores the distinction between constraints and assertions (see Table 2 for the details):
enforce(· · · R!(x) · · · ) = · · · R(x) · · · It is useful for extracting a formula that can be used to check whether or not the constraints are fulfilled. However, even if cls is a stratified and constrained formula, the formula enforce(cls) need not be a stratified formula of ALFP; as an example consider 1, ¬R(a) ⇒ R!(b) where R has rank 1.
Given a closed, stratified and constrained formula cls, we may define the validation function V(cls) = (ρ, b) as follows:
Here V(cls) = (ρ, b) means that ρ is the least solution when ignoring the constraints and b indicates whether or not the constraints are validated.
Example 2. Returning to Figure 1 and Example 2 we can now write the clauses to be generated for application and conditionals as in Figure 2 : In the case of (e l this amounts to adding the safety constraint ∀u :
The resulting clauses are stratifiable w.r.t. the rank function used before. Furthermore, ignore translates the clauses generated into clauses that are logically equivalent to the ones of Figure 1 , whereas enforce translates the clauses
)
l iff (A, B, C, P, R) e
0 then e
2 ) l iff (A, B, C, P, R) e generated into clauses that are logically equivalent to the conjunction of the ones of Figure 1 together with the constraints imposed in Example 1.
2
Constraint Violation
An alternative approach to calculating V(cls) = (ρ, b) where b indicates whether or not the least solution ρ validates the constraints is to directly record the violations to the constraints, if any. This corresponds to making use of so-called observation predicates [3] for tracking the violations to constraints. Intuitively we should be able to show that the constraints are validated if and only if there are no violations; this will be the result of Proposition 2 below.
To describe the alternative approach we define a function observe that translates · · · R!(x) · · · to · · · (¬R(x) ⇒ R E (x)) · · · where we assume that to each "ordinary" predicate R there potentially is an "observation" predicate R E (see Table 3 for the details):
We shall write R • for the set of ordinary predicates and R E for the set of observation predicates and assume that R is the disjoint union of these two sets. Furthermore, we extend the given ranking function rank by setting rank (R E ) = k + 1 for all observation predicates R E (regardless of the rank of R). We can now explain the use of observation predicates as an alternative strategy for definining the validation function V: Proposition 2. Writing · · · | R • for the restriction to ordinary predicates only we have:
Proof. Straightforward by the above reasoning. 2
Heuristics for Enforcing Constraints
As a fairly substantial motivating example consider a simplified presentation of the Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy for enforcing confidentiality [2, 6] . The basic entities are subjects (e.g. programs or users), objects (e.g. files), operations (read and write) and security levels (high and low). The actual operations are specified by statements of the form read(s, o) for indicating that the subject s is initiating a read-operation on the object o and similarly write(s, o) for indicating that the subject s is initiating a writeoperation on the object o.
The discretionary part of the access control policy is syntactically specified by statements of the form readable(o : s 1 , · · · , s n ) for indicating that the object o may be read by any one of the subjects s 1 , · · · , s n and by writable(o : s 1 , · · · , s n ) for indicating that the object o may be written by any one of the subjects s 1 , · · · , s n .
The mandatory part of the access control policy is syntactically specified by statements of the form subject(s : φ) for indicating that the subject s is allowed to operate at security level φ (being one of H or L) and by object(o : φ) for indicating that the object o may be accessed at security level φ (being one of H or L).
For the purposes of specifying the security policy we shall view the semantics as operating over configurations of the form (S, O, M, B). Here S(s, φ) records that the subject s has been previously allowed to operate at security level φ; in the classical presentation [6] it aims at capturing f C (s) = f S (s) = φ. Similarly, O(s, φ) records that the object o has been previously allowed to be manipulated at security level φ; in the classical presentation [6] M (s, o, w) captures that the object o has previously been recorded as writable by subject s; this is as in the classical presentation [6] . Finally, B(s, o, r) indicates that in the current state the subject s has initiated reading the object o and B(s, o, w) indicates that in the current state the subject s has initiated writing the object o; also this is as in [6] .
We shall develop a simple flow-insensitive analysis for keeping track of these operations and for enforcing the Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy (called mac). Since the analysis is flow-insensitive it may operate over an "abstract state" (S, O, M, B) as explained above. The clauses can then be generated as shown in Figure 3 .
The clauses for reading and writing make use of the policy mac also defined in Figure Figure 3 . The first line of mac considers a situation where a subject s is simultaneously writing an object o and reading an object o . The second line enforces that these operations have indeed been previously allowed as indicated by the access control matrix M . The remaining lines enforce that the security classification of o dominates those of s, o and that the security classification of o is dominated by those of s, o (relying once more on f C = f S in the classical presentation of [6] ).
The clause generated is clearly stratifiable. A simple choice of a ranking function is to take rank (S) = 1, rank (O) = 1, rank (M ) = 1 and rank (B) = 1. A more interesting choice (as we shall argue shortly) is to take rank (S) = 1, rank (O) = 2, rank (M ) = 3 and rank (B) = 4.
Example 3. To be a bit more concrete consider a program involving one subject sub and two objects ob1 and ob2: subject(sub:H); object(ob1:L); readable(ob1:sub); writable(ob1:sub); object(ob2:L); readable(ob2:sub); writable(ob2:sub); read(sub,ob2); write(sub,ob1);
Here there is a violation of the mandatory part of the access control policy: when sub reads ob2 and writes ob1 the security level of sub (which is H) must be dominated by that of ob1 (which is L).
Assuming that the program is intended to be legitimate we must modify the security annotations such that mac holds. Intutively, there are two ways to do so: one is to downgrade sub to L, the other is to upgrade ob1 to H. From a security policy point of view it is usually preferred to upgrade the objects rather than downgrading the subjects (see [6] for a discussion). In the present case this means that we prefer to add "spurious elements" to relations like O rather than relations like S. Hence we would like a general heuristists that, based on the rank-information automatically suggests remedial actions. We shall decide to go for an approach where we prefer to remedy the values of higher-rank relations rather than lowerrank relations; in operational terms this means restricting how far the Succinct Solver needs to backtrack and corresponds to its overall mode of operation as described in Section 2. In the present case this suggests taking rank (S) = 1, rank (O) = 2, rank (M ) = 3 and rank (B) = 4.
Acceptable Heuristics
So far we have been content with an optimal algorithm S for solving an analysis problem expressed by a closed and stratified formula, and an optimal algorithm V for solving and validating the constraints as expressed by a closed and stratified constrained formula. Turning to the construction of a heuristic algorithm H we shall shortly formulate a notion of optimality and show that in general there does not exist an optimal algorithm. Hence we shall consider candidate functions H of the form H(cls) = (ρ, ) and define when we consider them to be acceptable. Henceforth, we shall write cls ∈ F[rank ] to express that cls is a closed constrained formula that is stratified w.r.t. rank .
The first part of the development amounts to allowing to be freely chosen but to demand that ρ is constructed in an optimal manner from cls and and to show that this is always possible.
Definition 5. A function of the form H(cls) = (ρ, ) is a heuristics provided that ρ is least such that ρ ⊇ and (ρ, σ 0 ) |= ignore(cls) whenever cls ∈ F[rank ].
Proposition 3. If cls ∈ F[rank ] and is given, then there always exists a least ρ such that ρ ⊇ and (ρ, σ 0 ) |= ignore(cls).
Proof. The proof amounts to showing that ρ = {ρ ∈ ∆ | (ρ , σ 0 ) |= ignore(cls) ∧ ρ ⊇ } always exists and fulfils the demands. Many strategies of proof can be used, but for the purposes of this presentation we restrict ourselves to the case ∀R ∈ R : rank (R) > 0 where we can give a simple "syntactic" proof. Given cls = cl 1 , · · · , cl k we define the formula cls@ = cl 1 , · · · , cl k by setting
Clearly (ρ, σ 0 ) |= ignore(cls)@ is equivalent to (ρ, σ 0 ) |= ignore(cls) ∧ ρ ⊇ and hence the above formula for ρ amounts to ρ = S(ignore(cls)@ ).
The second part of the development amounts to ensuring that contains all the "spurious elements" that need to be admitted in order to fulfil the constraints. Proof. Take H(cls) = ( , ).
To be able to choose between acceptable heuristics we shall define a partial order for comparing them. We base it on the lexicographic order (rather than the subset-order) in order to capture the intentions expressed towards the end of Example 3.
Definition 7.
A heuristics H 1 is better than a heuristics H 2 , and equivalently H 2 is worse than H 1 , provided that for all cls ∈ F[rank ]: if H 1 (cls) = (ρ 1 , 1 ) and H 2 (cls) = (ρ 2 , 2 ) then 1 2 .
We prefer this definition to the alternative where we instead compare the resulting solutions, as in ρ 1 ρ 2 , because of its focus on the "spurious elements" that need to be added. Clearly the heuristics indicated in the proof of Fact 3 is worse than all others. It would be natural to try to find the best acceptable heuristics. Unfortunately, this is not possible, i.e. we do not have the analogue of a Moore Family result for acceptable heuristics. Proof. It suffices to find a stratified constrained formula cls for which no acceptable heuristics H can give a best result. For this consider the formula
where rank (R) = 1 and the universe is U = {a, b}. A heuristics H must produce one of the following pairs (ρ i , i ):
1. 1 (R) = ∅ and ρ 1 (R) = ∅; 2. 2 (R) = {a} and ρ 2 (R) = {a}; 3. 3 (R) = {b} and ρ 3 (R) = {b}; 4. 4 (R) = {a, b} and ρ 4 (R) = {a, b}.
Of these 2-4 are acceptable and 2-3 are acceptable and minimal. Since there are two incompatible minimal choices no optimal choice of an acceptable heuristics can exist. 2
A Good Acceptable Heuristics
We now consider a class of parameterised iterative heuristic algorithms of the form H[choose, take]. Here choose is a function intended to select an index from a set of indices, and take is a function intended to select part of a partial solution; it will turn out that our preferred candidate has choose = max and take = λ .
(i.e. the identity). The definition is given in Table 4 . It accepts as input a closed, constrained and stratified formula cls w.r.t. a ranking function rank (that without loss of generality is assumed to use non-zero ranks only) and produces the pair (ρ, ). It operates in an iterative manner, "backpropagating" any violations to constraints. We use the function observe(· · · R!(x) · · · ) = · · · ¬R(x) ⇒ R E (x) · · · of Table  3 and we write R • i for the set of ordinary predicates of rank i and similarly R E j for the set of error predicates corresponding to ordinary predicates of rank j and finally we use · · · | R to denote the restriction to a set R of predicates.
We shall briefly consider three algorithms. One is H[max , λ . ] that selects the maximum index for which a violation of the constraints have been observed and then selects the entire error-component corresponding to this index. Another is H[min, λ . ] that selects the minimum index for which a violation of the constraints have been observed and then selects the entire error-component corresponding to this index. A potential third algorithm is H[first, first] that somewhat informally chooses the first index and tuple for which an error is observed. While the first two algorithms have been precisely defined and are evaluation-order independent, the third algorithm is somewhat informally defined and is clearly evaluation-order dependent (in terms of the operation of the Succinct Solver [10] as surveyed in Section 2).
The correct operation of the algorithm is guaranteed by:
is an acceptable heuristics if ∀I : choose(I) ∈ I and ∀ρ i :ρ i = ⊥ ⇒ take(ρ i ) = ⊥.
INPUT cls = cl1, · · · , cl k and rank
s.t. rank uses non-zero ranks only Proof. The assumptions suffice for proving that H[choose, take] always terminates because in each iteration of the loop the tuple (
will be strictly increasing w.r.t. the lexicographic order defined using for ( 1 , · · · , i , ⊥, · · · , ⊥) and ≤ for i.
This shows that all three algorithms are acceptable heuristics. As our preferred choice we discount H[first, first] because it is evaluation-order dependent and hence hard to characterise; indeed it may appear non-deterministic in case of even simple logically equivalent formula rearrangements. where rank (R) = 1, rank (S) = 2 and rank (T ) = 3. Here H[min, λ . ] produces (R) = ∅, (S) = {b}, (T ) = ∅ and ρ(R) = {a}, ρ(S) = {a, b}, ρ(T ) = {a}, whereas H[max , λ . ] produces (R) = {b}, (S) = ∅, (T ) = {b} and ρ(R) = {a, b}, ρ(S) = {a}, ρ(T ) = {a, b}. 2
Conclusion
We have extended the flow logic approach to static analysis: instead of merely specifying admissible solutions to analysis problems we additionally specify constraints to be enforced on the admissible solutions. Our use of a simple syntactic distinction between assertions, R(x), and constraints, R!(x), have resulted in very readable specifications, as was illustrated on a simple "typing example" for the λ-calculus. Our main contribution is the development of a heuristics that facilitates loosening some of the constraints in order for a security policy to hold for selected programs. The motivating example for this development has been the Bell-LaPadula mandatory access control policy. Our strategy for loosening constraints has been to keep the logical formulae unchanged but to admit more elements in the constraining predicates; we have generally referred to these as "spurious elements". We have studied and proposed heuristics for iteratively recomputing least solutions to analysis problems in such a way that the final solution adheres to the constraints posed. Also we have shown that a heuristics is all that can be hoped for.
It is worth pointing out that this inherently iterative procedure can still be formulated in a logical setting; this distinguishes our approach from that of others (which to our knowledge remains unpublished). The general mechanism facilitating our development has been to use the rank-information to express the order of preference for adding the "spurious elements". We believe there to be a fair amount of flexibility in the choice of a ranking function rank for turning a stratifiable clause into a formula that is stratified wrt. rank ; generally it should be possible to assign low ranks to predicates recording simple observations from the program whereas the predicates carrying the actual control flow information may be so interdependent that they alle need to get the same rank.
Further work is needed for determining the extent to which this approach is applicable to other security features; possibilities include restricting the behaviour of subjects inside the Trusted Computing Base and identifying the need for enlarging the Trusted Computing Base.
